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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. government historically has had broad authority to
1
conduct foreign surveillance without a warrant to obtain information
2
to protect against national security threats. However, the recent
September 11, 2001 attacks have forced the government to recognize
that threats to national security can and do occur from within the
United States.3 Thus, on occasion, the President has sanctioned
4
domestic surveillance.
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1. In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating that “all the
other courts to have decided the issue, held that the President did have inherent authority to
conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence information . . . . We take for
granted that the President does have that authority [to conduct warrantless searches for foreign
intelligence purposes].”).
2. Id.; Susan Page, NSA Secret Database Report Triggers Fierce Debate in Washington,
USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-0511-nsa-reax_x.htm [hereinafter Page, NSA Secret Database]; Richard A. Posner, Editorial, Our
Domestic Intelligence Crisis, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A31.
3. See Leslie Cauley, NSA has massive database of Americans’ phone calls, USA TODAY,
May 11, 2006, at 1A; Robert Block & Jay Solomon, Pentagon Steps Up Intelligence Efforts
Inside U.S. Borders, CANDIDE’S NOTEBOOKS, Apr. 27, 2006, at A1, available at
http://www.pierretristam.com/Bobst/library/wf-178.htm.
4. Dan Eggen, Bush Authorized Domestic Spying, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1
(eavesdropping on domestic calls since 2002); Eric Lichtblau, Bank Data Secretly Reviewed by
U.S. to Fight Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2006, at A1.
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In May 2006, USA TODAY reported that the National Security
5
Agency (NSA) had created a database containing “tens of millions”
6
of domestic call records obtained from various telecommunication
providers.7 The NSA then datamined8 the records to detect possible
9
terrorist threats against national security. This Note analyzes the
legality of the NSA call database.10
First, Part I discusses the factual background surrounding the
NSA call database and the response from the President and the
public. Part II looks at whether the government can legally collect
call records without a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) and Pen Register Statute or alternatively
using a National Security Letter (NSL). Part II also examines the
telecommunication
providers’
liability
under
the
1996

5. John Diamond & Leslie Cauley, Pre-9/11 Records Help Flag Suspicious Calling, USA
TODAY, May 22, 2006, at 6A. However, it has been alleged that the NSA has access to an
AT&T call database containing 1.9 trillion call records. John Markoff, Taking Snooping
Further: Government Looks at Ways to Mine Databases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, at C1.
Relatively speaking, the 1.9 trillion call record database is small compared to some corporate
databases such as Wal-Mart’s. Kevin Maney, Size of NSA’s Database of Phone-Call Records
isn’t All That Impressive, USA TODAY, May 16, 2006, at 3B.
6. Call records “are the electronic information that is logged automatically each time a
call is initiated. For more than 20 years, local and long-distance companies have used call . . .
records to figure out how much to charge each other for handling calls and to determine
problems with equipment.” Diamond & Cauley, supra note 5.
7. Cauley, supra note 3.
8. Datamining is defined as “the process of collecting large amounts of data from different
sources . . . then searching for patterns within the data using computerized tools . . . with the
goal of identifying significant relationships and predicting future trends and events.” Matthew
B. Stannard, U.S. Phone-Call Database Ignites Privacy Uproar, S.F. CHRON., May 12, 2006, at
A1; Laura K. Donohue, Criminal Law: Anglo-American Privacy And Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1144-45 (finding that the U.S. government has previously engaged in
199 datamining operations for various reasons “such as improving services, managing human
resources, and detecting terrorist activity”).
9. Cauley, supra note 3.
10. For a preliminary analysis of some of the legal issues discussed in this Note see Posting
of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/05/further-thoughts-onlawfulness-of.html (May 11, 2006, 10:08 PM); OrinKerr.com, More Thoughts on the Legality of
the NSA Call Records Program, http://www.orinkerr.com/2006/05/12/more-thoughts-on-thelegality-of-the-nsa-call-records-program/ (May 12, 2006, 3:30 AM) [hereinafter Kerr, More
Thoughts]; Posting of Kate Martin to ACS Blog, http://www.acsblog.org/bill-of-rights-guestblogger-nsa-again-violates-the-law.html (May 11, 2006 4:26 PM); Posting of Orin Kerr to The
Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1147361955.shtml (May 11, 2006, 12:13 PM)
[hereinafter Kerr, Thoughts]; CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ILLEGAL NSA DATA MINING
HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (2006), http://www.cdt.org/
publications/policyposts/2006/8; The Online Newshour, Legality of NSA Phone Program
Questioned, PBS, May 12, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june06/privacy_0512.html.
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Telecommunications Act and 1986 Store Communications Act for
voluntarily disclosing the records to the government.
Part III then asks whether datamining the obtained call records
would constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment. Part IV discusses possible defenses available to the
government, such as the state secrets privilege and the President’s
authority (express and inherent) to bypass FISA. In Part V, the
analysis shifts to the international stage and whether the NSA call
database would be legal in Canada, the United Kingdom, and
Australia, each of which strike a different balance between privacy
rights and national security concerning the collecting and mining of
call records than the United States.
I. BACKGROUND
11

On May 10, 2006, USA TODAY published a story alleging that
12
the NSA had created a secret database containing “tens of
millions”13 of domestic call records with information such as the
duration, date, and time of the call, and the caller and recipient’s
14
phone numbers. However, the NSA’s database neither contained
the content of the call nor the customer’s name or address.15 The
NSA, without a warrant, allegedly obtained the phone records from
16
telecommunication providers such as AT&T and MCI by setting up
17
a “real time” direct connection from the phone providers to the
11. Susan Page, Lawmakers: NSA Database Incomplete, USA TODAY, June 30, 2006, at
2A [hereinafter Page, Lawmakers] (stating that President Bush has not “directly confirmed” the
existence of the call database).
12. Page, NSA Secret Database, supra note 2. President Bush has stated that “appropriate
members of Congress, both Republican and Democrat” were briefed about the program. Id.
However, one member of Congress said “she hadn’t been told all of the information included in
the USA TODAY story. And all but a handful of lawmakers learned of the program for the
first time in the news account.” Id.
13. See supra note 5.
14. Diamond & Cauley, supra note 5 (stating that the NSA acquired the “number from
which a call [was] made, . . . the number called; the route a call took to reach its final
destination; the time, date and place where a call started and ended; and the duration of the
call. The records also note whether the call was placed from a cellphone or from a traditional
‘land line.’”).
15. Page, Lawmakers, supra note 11.
16. Id.
17. Seymour M. Hersh, National Security Dept. Listening In, THE NEW YORKER, May 22,
2006, at 24 (stating that “[t]he N.S.A. is getting real-time actionable intelligence”). See also
Texas A&M Glossary of Distance Education Terms, http://www.tamu.edu/ode/glossary.html
(last visited Dec. 13, 2006) (defining “real time” as “[a]n application in which information is
received and immediately responded to without any time delay”).
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NSA headquarters.18 One carrier, Qwest, allegedly refused to grant
the government access, citing concerns about the legality of the
19
program without a warrant, about who would have access to this
20
data, and how it would be used.21
After creating the database, the NSA allegedly datamined the
call records for patterns or trends22 of possible threats against national
23
security. For example, the NSA computers would flag calls to the
United States coming from countries in the Middle East if the person
receiving the call subsequently made a domestic call.24 The NSA
would then connect the flagged numbers to known phone numbers
25
After datamining the records, it is
linked to terrorist activity.
alleged that the NSA plans to keep the data indefinitely.26
President Bush has neither directly confirmed nor denied the
existence of the NSA call database program.27 However, President
Bush has stated, in defending the wiretapping of international calls,
that “one end of the [phone] communication must be outside the

18. Hersh, supra note 17 (stating that the telecommunication provider would setup a “highspeed circuit between its main computer complex and . . . [the] government-intelligence
computer center”); Stephen Lawson, Documents in AT&T Spying Case Unsealed, MACWORLD,
May 29, 2006, http://prisonplanet.com/articles/may2006/290506Documents.htm.
19. Cauley, supra note 3.
20. Id. (stating, “The NSA told Qwest that other government agencies, including the FBI,
CIA and DEA, also might have access to the database . . . . The NSA regularly shares its
information—known as ‘product’ in intelligence circles—with other intelligence groups.”).
21. Id.
22. Alternatively, the call records could be used to assist in a wide range of investigations,
such as by the police or government intelligence agencies. The NSA’s New New Phone
Database, http://www.radioopensource.org/the-nsas-new-new-phone-database/ (last visited Jan.
2, 2007). For example, assume the government believes that person X is a threat to national
security. Instead of having to obtain a subpoena to get that person’s phone records, the NSA
could simply look up the person’s name in the phone book or through other means, and obtain
the person’s number Y. Once the number Y is obtained, a government agency could then
search the NSA call database for all calls made “to” and “from” that number Y. Moreover, the
NSA is allegedly obtaining the real time data and the location of the call. See Diamond &
Cauley, supra note 5. Thus, it could pinpoint a person’s whereabouts in a matter of seconds
after
the
call
is
made.
See
Velcro,
Officials
Spy
on
Calls,
http://www.whatever.net.au/pipermail/velcro/2002-May/000090.html (May 1, 2002 16:30).
23. Cauley, supra note 3.
24. Diamond & Cauley, supra note 5.
25. Id.
26. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., supra note 10.
27. See Page, Lawmakers, supra note 11; see also Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d
974, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (stating that the “court notes that despite many public reports . . . the
government . . . has never publicly disclosed whether the NSA program reported by USA Today
on May 11, 2006, actually exists”) (emphasis added).
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United States,”28 leading most people to believe that only
international calls—not domestic calls—were susceptible to
29
surveillance.
In addition to the President’s response to the call database, the
public has responded via public opinion polls and lawsuits. A USA
TODAY/Gallup poll found that fifty-one percent of Americans
30
disapprove of the program. USA TODAY has also reported that as
many as twenty class-action lawsuits have been filed in federal court
against the government and telecommunication providers.31
II. DID THE NSA OBTAIN THE CALL RECORDS LEGALLY?
A. Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act
In 1975, a Congressional examination revealed that for at least
twenty years the NSA had been intercepting international
communications without a warrant at the request of various
government agencies.32 This revelation prompted the 1978 enactment
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),33 which outlines
the procedures that the government must follow to conduct electronic
34
surveillance with or without a warrant.
1. Electronic Surveillance. The first legal question is whether
the acquisition of call records constitutes “electronic surveillance,”
28. Cauley, supra note 3.
29. Id.
30. Susan Page, Poll: 51% Oppose NSA Database, USA TODAY, May 14, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-14-nsa-reax-poll_x.htm?POE=NEWISVA
[hereinafter Page, Poll]. Two other polls have been taken by Newsweek and The Washington
Post. David Jefferson, Newsweek Poll: Americans Wary of NSA Spying Bush’s Approval
Ratings
hit
new
lows
as
Controversy
Rages,
MSNBC,
May
14,
2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12771821/site/newsweek/ (finding that fifty-three percent of
people think the NSA call database is objectionable); Washington Post-ABC News Poll, WASH.
POST, May 12, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postpoll_
nsa_051206.htm (finding, in a poll taken before the USA TODAY/Gallup discussed in the text,
that sixty-three percent consider the NSA call database an acceptable method to investigate
terrorism). The USA TODAY/Gallup Poll may differ from the previous Washington Post poll
in the way in which the question was asked, and additionally, the Gallup Poll includes more
respondents and less margin of error. Page, Poll, supra.
31. Page, Lawmakers, supra note 11.
32. Cauley, supra note 3.
33. 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829, 1841-1846, 1861-1862, 1871 (LexisNexis 2006); see
also Page, Lawmakers, supra note 11.
34. See Cauley, supra note 3; 50 U.S.C.S. § 1805(a) (LexisNexis 2006); 50 U.S.C.S. §
1802(a)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2004).
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which is defined35 in § 1801(f)(1) as “the acquisition by an
electronic . . . device . . . of the contents of any wire . . . sent by . . . a
36
particular, known United States person who is in the United States.”
Section 1801(n) defines “contents” as “any information concerning
the identity of the parties to such communication or the existence,
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.”37 Thus, §
1801(n) broad definition covers more than merely the contents of a
38
phone call and extends to the existence of the communication.
Implicit in this definition of “electronic surveillance” is that the
acquisition must occur in real time. In other words, the collection of
historical records would not likely constitute “electronic
39
40
surveillance.” The NSA is probably obtaining real time call records
as “[i]t does them no good to have [the telecommunication providers]
back up the truck and unload the tapes. It needs a live feed from the
server.”41 While it is true that the call records are missing customer
identifiable information, such as the caller’s name, the NSA could
cross-reference those records in a matter of seconds to identify the
persons to the communication. The fact that an extra step is required

35. The Senate Judiciary Committee (by a ten to eight vote) approved the National
Security Surveillance Act of 2006 (also known as Senate Bill 2453). Source Watch, National
Security Surveillance Act of 2006, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=National_
Security_Surveillance_Act_of_2006 (last visited Dec. 13, 2006). Senate Bill 2453 redefines, in §
701(4), “electronic surveillance” to only require a warrant when the program captures the
substance of the communication. The Orator Network, S. 2453, http://www.theorator.com/
bills109/s2453.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2006). Thus, the collection of call records by the NSA
would probably not be considered electronic surveillance because the call records do not
capture the substance of the communication. It is questionable whether the bill will be passed
because the Democrats currently have control over both Houses.
36. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1801(f)(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (emphasis added).
37. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1801(n) (LexisNexis 2006) (emphasis added).
38. Cf. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2510(8) (LexisNexis 2002) (defining “contents” for criminal
interception of electronic communications as “any information concerning the substance,
purport, or meaning of that communication”).
39. See Tom Brune, Bush under fire for phone taps, NEWS DAY, May 12, 2006, at A4
(stating that “[r]eal-time collection of data would require the NSA to get a warrant . . . [under
the FISA, but] if the NSA is collecting historical records, the telecommunications companies
face [potential liability under a different Act]”); Bush Responds to USA TODAY Story
Regarding NSA Database of Phone Calls, TECH L. J. (May 11, 2006),
http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2006/20060511b.asp (distinguishing between real time
and non-real time collection of data in analyzing the government’s potential liability under
FISA).
40. Hersh, supra note 17.
41. William Arkin et al., Bush Defends Spying After NSA Database Report, MSNBC, May
11, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12734870/page/3/.
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to identify the person should not allow the government to bypass
FISA.
Notwithstanding that the call records do not identify the parties
to the communication, the call records do prove that a
communication took place and thus would confirm the “existence” of
the communication in § 1801(n); accordingly, the NSA would be
acquiring “contents” in § 1801(f)(1) and therefore conducting
electronic surveillance within the meaning of FISA.
2. FISA Procedures. Even if the government is conducting
electronic surveillance, FISA provides two possible procedures that
42
could permit the surveillance. The first procedure is not important
from a legal perspective, as the NSA did not seek a warrant for the
acquisition of call records.43 But the decision is perplexing from a
strategic perspective, as only five applications out of nineteen
thousand have been refused by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court44 and the government’s submission is ex parte.45
The
government most likely did not follow the first procedure, for it
believed that the court would not approve a program of the size and
scope of the NSA call database.46 When it was enacted, FISA did not
contemplate a program like the call database, which involves millions
47
of people and possibly thousands of targets. Moreover, the Bush
administration finds the procedures of FISA too slow to react to the
threat of terrorism.48
In addition to proceeding with a warrant, the President can
conduct electronic surveillance without a warrant for one year,
provided three conditions are met.49 First, the electronic surveillance

42. See 50 U.S.C.S. § 1805(a) (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring five conditions be met to obtain
a warrant for conducting electronic surveillance).
43. See background discussion supra Part I.
44. Electronic Frontier Foundation, ATT-NSA FAQ, http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/
faq.php (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).
45. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1805(a) (LexisNexis 2006).
46. Page, NSA Secret Database, supra note 2; Cauley, supra note 3.
47. Posting of David Edwards to Veredictum, NSA Uses Private Firms for Massive
Unchecked Domestic Surveillance, http://veredictum.com/node/109 (Feb. 27, 2006 12:44).
48. Cauley, supra note 3; Revising FISA to Address 21st Century Threats to National
Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2d sess. (2006) (testimony by Robert D. Alt, Fellow, The
John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs); Mort Kondracke, NSA Data Mining Is Legal,
Necessary, Sec. Chertoff Says, REAL CLEAR POL., Jan. 20, 2006, http://www.realclear
politics.com/Commentary/com-1_20_06_MK.html.
49. See 50 U.S.C.S. § 1802 (LexisNexis 2004).
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must involve acquiring the “content of the communication” between
50
Second, the surveillance cannot “acquire the
foreign powers.
contents of any communication to which a United States person51 is a
party.”52 Finally, the surveillance must meet the “minimization
53
Under the first prong, it is
procedures” defined in § 1801(h).
unlikely that millions of people would be considered a foreign power.
Next, and most important, the government appears to be acquiring
the “contents” of a communication to which a citizen of United States
is a party. Finally, prong three is unlikely to succeed because it is
doubtful that the scope of the program meets the “minimization
procedures”54 required by FISA.
B. Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices
55

A pen register records all the phone numbers dialed from a
56
particular telephone, and a trap and trace device records all numbers
57
that dial a specific phone number. There are two statutes that allow
the use of a pen register or trap and trace device provided certain
conditions are met.
58
Under the first statute, FISA, these devices can only be used if
the Attorney General certifies that “information likely . . . is relevant
to an ongoing investigation to protect against international
terrorism . . . provided that such investigation of a United States
person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected
by the first amendment to the Constitution.”59 This statute is unlikely

50. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1802(a)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2004).
51. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1801(i) (LexisNexis 2006) (defining a “‘United States person’ . . . [as] a
citizen . . . an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resident” and corporations incorporated in
the United States).
52. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1802(a)(1)(B) (LexisNexis 2004) (emphasis added).
53. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1801(h) (LexisNexis 2006).
54. Id. (stating, in part, the government is required “to minimize the acquisition and
retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning
unconsenting United States persons”).
55. A “pen register” is defined as “a device or process which records . . . dialing . . .
information transmitted by an instrument.” 18 U.S.C.S. § 3127(3) (LexisNexis 2001); 50 U.S.C.
§1841(2) (2000).
56. A “trap and trace device” is “a device or process which captures the incoming
electronic . . . impulses which identify the originating number.” 18 U.S.C.S. § 3127(4)
(LexisNexis 2001); 50 U.S.C. §1841(2) (2000).
57. Everything2, NSA phone record database, http://www.everything2.com/index.pl?node_
id=1807359 (May 17, 2006, 6:38).
58. 50 U.S.C.S. §§1841-1846 (LexisNexis 2006).
59. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1842(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2006).
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to apply because the acquisition of millions of records would not
likely be relevant to an ongoing investigation; the government would
not know if a person was a terrorist threat until it obtained the
records and performed the necessary analysis.
The second statute, the criminal pen register,60 prohibits both the
use of a pen register or trap and trace device unless the court
61
The
approves the device or an exception applies.
telecommunication providers can use either device to obtain the call
records under the operation and maintenance exception,62 such as
billing. However, if the NSA is obtaining real time call records from
the phone providers, then it would be using the same device as the
telecommunication providers, yet not meeting any of the exceptions
such as maintenance and operation.
Alternatively, if the NSA did not acquire the call records in real
time, it could be argued that the telecommunication providers legally
collected the call records and then the NSA obtained these records
63
without using any devices. However, that argument would render
64
the pen register statute meaningless, as the NSA could circumvent
the statute and obtain all the same information (such as phone
numbers) that they would normally acquire through either the pen
register and/or trap and trace device. Thus, it is difficult to reconcile
how it is legal to acquire pen register information without a court
order through the telecommunication providers, yet it is illegal to use
a pen register without a court order to obtain the same information.65
C. National Security Letter as an Alternative to FISA
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2709, also known as the National Security
66
Letter (NSL), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) can obtain

60. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 3121-3127 (LexisNexis 2002).
61. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3121(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2001).
62. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3121(b) (LexisNexis 2001).
63. See Kerr, Thoughts, supra note 10.
64. See id.
65. Legal Issues Governing the Administration’s Newly Disclosed Surveillance Program,
Unclaimed
Territory,
http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/05/legal-issues-governingadministrations.html (May 11, 2006, 1:34).
66. The FBI is issuing more than thirty thousand NSLs per year. Robyn E. Blumner,
National Security Letters Put Privacy at Risk, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at 5P;
Christopher P. Raab, iBrief, Fighting Terrorism in an Electronic Age: Does the PATRIOT Act
Unduly Compromise Our Civil Liberties?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0003 ¶ 26 (2006)
(stating that “the FBI issues more than 30,000 NSLs yearly, a number that the Justice
Department would neither confirm nor deny”).
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records without a warrant if the “records sought are relevant to an
67
authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism.”
Further, the recipient of an NSL is prohibited from disclosing the fact
that the government made the request.68
An interesting legal issue is whether the NSA could have the FBI
obtain the call records using a NSL and then share69 that information
70
with the NSA, thus avoiding the requirements of FISA. The answer
is likely no. The FBI usually conducts targeted investigations of
individual suspects based on known facts.71 Thus, Congress did not
contemplate giving the FBI authority to make broad,
indistinguishable requests for numerous records without any
Section 2709(b)(1) prohibits any
individualized suspicion.72
73
investigation based on activities protected by the First Amendment;
the collection of phone records could be seen as violating that clause
because the NSA is collecting data based on phone conversations.74
75
Finally, an NSL “is an administrative subpoena,” meaning that the
subpoena must be relevant, limited, and specific enough to avoid
being too burdensome.76 The request by the FBI for the call records
would not meet any of these conditions because the request would be
for all call records without any suspicion of terrorist activity.
D. Telecommunication Providers’ Liability
The 1996 Telecommunications Act states that “[e]very
telecommunications carrier has a duty to protect the confidentiality of
proprietary information. . . relating to . . . customers.”77
This
customer proprietary network information (CPNI) has been defined

67. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2709(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
68. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2709(c) (LexisNexis 2006).
69. Cauley, supra note 3.
70. The FBI could also use something similar to an NSL called the “library records
provision” (LRP) under 50 U.S.C.S. § 1861 (LexisNexis 2006). Blumner, supra note 66. In
contrast to the NSL, which does not require any judicial oversight, the LRP would require ex
parte court approval before any records could be obtained. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1861(c) (LexisNexis
2006). Thus, the LRP requires at least one more step before any records can be acquired.
71. Martin, supra note 10.
72. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C.S. § 2709(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that the FBI can obtain
records “of a person [not millions of persons] or entity”) (emphasis added).
73. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2709(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
74. Lederman, supra note 10.
75. Doe I v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 417 (2d Cir. 2006).
76. Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984); see Lederman, supra note 10.
77. 47 U.S.C. § 222(a) (2000).
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as “information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration,
type, destination, and amount of use of a telecommunications service
78
subscribed to by any customer.”
The first question is whether the call records’ details, such as
79
duration, timing, and phone numbers, acquired by the NSA
constitute CPNI. The Federal Communications Commission has
recently stated that “CPNI includes information such as the phone
numbers called by a consumer; the frequency, duration, and timing of
such calls; and any services purchased by the consumer, such as call
waiting.
CPNI therefore includes highly-sensitive personal
information.”80 Thus, it is likely that the telecommunication providers
were prohibited from disclosing the call records to the government
81
unless the customer consented, required by law, related to billing, to
prevent fraud, and one of a few other exceptions was present.82
83
The government could argue that the consumer has consented
to the disclosure through the standard phone contract or
alternatively, that the government coerced the phone providers to
84
supply those records. The problem with the first argument is that
any disclosure provision in the contract would likely be voided based
on public policy concerns or violating the spirit of the
Telecommunications Act. Further, according to 47 C.F.R. § 64.2007,
a customer can always revoke his or her approval,85 and this would be
likely once the customer learns how his or her information is being
used.
The second argument is weaker as it appears the

78. 47 U.S.C. § 222(h)(1)(A) (2000); Leah E. Capritta, Tenth Circuit Survey:
Communications Law: U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC Interprets the First Amendment Ramifications of
“Customer Proprietary Network Information,” 77 DENV. U.L. REV. 441, 442 (2000) (quoting
California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 930 (9th Cir. 1994)) (stating that “CPNI is information about a
telephone customer’s use of the telephone network, such as the number of lines ordered, service
location, type and class of services purchased, usage levels, and calling patterns”).
79. Diamond & Cauley, supra note 5.
80. In Re Telecommunications Act of 1996, 21 FCC Rcd 1782, 1784 (2006) (emphasis
added).
81. 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (2000).
82. See 47 U.S.C. § 222(d)(1)-(4) (2000).
83. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2007(a) (2007) (stating that a phone provider can obtain customer
consent to use customer proprietary network information “through written, oral or electronic
methods”).
84. Talk Left, NSA Phone Records: What’s the Problem?, http://www.talkleft.com/story/
2006/05/13/892/21491 (May 13, 2006, 12:16:07 PM EST).
85. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2007(a)(2) (2007).
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telecommunication providers had a voluntary agreement with the
86
government.
In addition to the Telecommunications Act, the 1986 Stored
Communications Act (SCA) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2702) states that
“a provider of remote computing service or electronic
87
communication . . . shall not knowingly divulge a record . . .
88
pertaining to a subscriber . . . to any governmental entity.” There
are six potential exceptions in § 2702(c), including consent by the
customer and emergency (death or serious injury).89
Before
addressing consent, it is unlikely that the disclosure of call records is
90
necessary to avoid immediate death or serious injury as the call
database was enacted to identify future terrorist threats.
The consent exception is not likely to succeed because the First
Circuit, in construing consent in an analogous statute,91 gave it a
narrow meaning. The court “emphasize[d] that ‘consent should not

86. See background discussion supra Part I.
87. It may be possible to argue that the telecommunication providers are long-distance
carriers and thus not providers of electronic communication service as defined in § 2510(15).
OrinKerr.com, New Facts Suggest A Possible Reason Why the Phone Companies May Not Be
Liable For the NSA Call Records Program, http://www.orinkerr.com/2006/05/18/new-factssuggest-a-possible-reason-why-the-phone-companies-may-not-be-liable-for-the-nsa-callrecords-program (May 18, 2006, 1:30 PM) [hereinafter Kerr, New Facts].
88. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2702(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2006). Section 2702(a)(1) and (a)(2) do not apply
because the telecommunication provider is not disclosing “contents.” Section 2711 states, “As
used in this chapter . . . the terms defined in § 2510 of this title . . . have, respectively, the
definitions given such terms in that section.” 18 U.S.C.S. § 2711(1) (LexisNexis 2006). Section
2510 defines “contents” as any “electronic communication . . . concerning the substance,
purport, or meaning of that communication.” 18 U.S.C.S. § 2510 (LexisNexis 2002). Thus, call
records’ details would likely not fit within this definition because the phone conversation
contents are not being transferred to the NSA.
89. Disclosure is also permitted when (1) authorized by § 2703; (2) a necessary part of
service; (3) “connection with a report submitted thereto under section 227 of the Victims of
Child Abuse Act of 1990”; (4) any person not a government entity. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2702(c)
(LexisNexis 2006). The only possible disclosure exception that could apply is the “authorized
by section 2703” exception. Section 2703(c) permits disclosure when the government obtains a
warrant, obtains a court order, obtains consent, is enforceing laws against telemarketing fraud,
or is using an administrative subpoena. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (LexisNexis 2006). It is unlikely
that § 2703’s first four exceptions apply. As for its fifth exception, it is also unlikely as the NSA
might not have administrative subpoena power and even if it did, there is no evidence that it was
issued. Imjtk, Your Telco owes you $1,000, http://imjtk.com/your-telco-owes-you-1000.php
(May 14, 2006); see generally, Lederman, supra note 10 (stating that “there appears to have been
no such administrative subpoena here”).
90. Kerr, Thoughts, supra note 10.
91. Id. (stating, “There are no cases interpreting [exactly] . . . what consent means in
2702(c)(2), but like many of the exceptions in the SCA it is clearly a copy of an analogous
exception in the close cousin of the SCA, the federal Wiretap Act . . . .”).
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casually be inferred,’ . . . particularly in a case of deficient notice. The
surrounding circumstances must convincingly show that the party
knew about and consented to the interception in spite of the lack of
formal notice or deficient formal notice.”92 Thus, because the
customers likely had no notice of the transfer of call records, it is
doubtful that the customers consented to the records being disclosed
by the phone providers.
Even if the government applied for a court order after obtaining
the records without meeting one of the exceptions to validate the
transfer, it is likely that the request would be denied.93 In one case, a
carrier provided the government with records voluntarily and the
government then applied for a court order afterwards to retroactively
94
validate the transfer. In denying the government’s request for an
order, the court held that the government was required to obtain an
order before the telecommunication provider disclosed the records. 95
Finally, an argument could be made that the SCA only prohibits
the disclosure of stored records as opposed to records acquired in real
time.96 A Federal District Court noted, “As implied by its full title
(‘Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional
Records Access’), the entire focus of the SCA is [on] . . . existing
communications . . . .”97 This conclusion is based on that fact that
there are procedural protections in other statutes permitting real time
surveillance that are absent in the SCA.98 Unlike both the Pen
Register Statute and Wiretap Act, the SCA’s law enforcement
92. United States v. Lanoue, 71 F.3d 966, 981 (1st Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
93. See In re Application of U.S. For a Nunc Pro Tunc Order For Disclosure of
Telecommunications Records, 352 F.Supp.2d 45 (D. Mass. 2005).
94. Id. at 46.
95. See id.
96. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a
Pen Register and a Caller Identification Sys. on Tele. Nos. [sealed] and [sealed] and the Prod. of
Real Time Cell Site Info., 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (D. Md. 2005); In re Application of the U.S.
for Orders Authorizing the Installation and Use of Pen Registers and Caller Identification
Devices on Tel. Nos. [sealed] and [sealed], 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 395 (D. Md. 2006) (stating, “The
structure of the SCA shows that the statute does not contemplate orders for prospective [or real
time] information.”).
97. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a
Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting In re Application for
Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 760
(S.D. Tex. 2005)) (emphasis added).
98. Id. (emphasis added); In re Orders Authorizing Pen Registers and Caller Identification
Devices, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 395 n.7. (stating, “The SCA regulates access to records and
communications in storage and therefore lacks provisions typical of prospective [or real time]
surveillance statutes.”).
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surveillance is not limited in length by a court order and the order is
not required to be automatically sealed to maintain secrecy of the
99
surveillance. Thus, if Congress intended the SCA to cover real time
disclosure of records then it would have included in the SCA similar
100
real time provisions.
In contrast, another court has found that because the SCA has no
express limitation on the disclosure of real time data, that the SCA
101
covers both the disclosure of stored and real-time records.
Moreover, even if the SCA only covers stored records, it is possible to
argue that the records will be stored, if only briefly, by the phone
providers before transferring those records to the NSA; accordingly,
the phone providers would be violating the SCA by disclosing those
102
stored records.
The better-reasoned of the two arguments is that
the real time disclosure of call records would not violate the SCA
unless historical records were disclosed. This is based on the fact that
the SCA is missing the same structural characteristics as other real
time statutes and a momentary storage of call records should not
count as a stored record under the SCA.
III. DID THE GOVERNMENT VIOLATE THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT BY DATAMINING THE CALL RECORDS?
The Fourth Amendment protects the “[t]he right of the
people . . . against unreasonable searches.”103 A challenge based on
the Fourth Amendment requires that a person can claim “a
‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been
invaded by government action.”104 The reasonable expectation of
privacy analysis asks first, does the person have an actual (subjective)
privacy expectation, and second, does society (objectively) consider
the person’s privacy expectation reasonable.105 If the person meets
both prongs of this test or establishes a legitimate privacy
expectation, then the court must decide whether the intrusion is

99. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a
Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
104. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream Data, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 61, 71 (19992000).
105. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740; Skok, supra note 104, at 71.
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reasonable.106 The reasonableness of the search is based on the
107
meaning of the Amendment at the time it was framed or, if that
yields no result, through a balancing test that weighs the private
interest against the government interest.108
A. Prong One: Individual Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
109
110
Both United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland, decided
in a span of three years, indicate that a person does not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in records that are voluntarily
conveyed to a third-party. In Miller, the issue was whether the
government violated the Fourth Amendment by requiring a bank to
copy and inspect a person’s records.111 The Court held that a person
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in information held by the
112
Similarly, in Smith, the issue was whether the
third-party bank.
government had performed a search under the Fourth Amendment113
when a phone company, at the government’s request, installed a pen
114
The Court held that the
register to record the numbers dialed.
person had no privacy expectation in the dialed numbers because
those numbers are necessarily conveyed to the phone providers.115
However, Miller and Smith fail to consider how the Fourth
Amendment has been altered over time with changing technology.
For example, in Olmstead v. United States,116 the Court initially held
that no warrant was required to tap a phone line,117 but later, in Katz
v. United States,118 the Court held that public conversations monitored
119
The Katz
by the government violated the Fourth Amendment.
approach could be viewed as “embrac[ing] whatever rules are needed

106. Skok, supra note 104, at 71.
107. Id. at 71-72.
108. Id.
109. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
110. 442 U.S. at 735.
111. Miller, 425 U.S. at 439-40.
112. See id. at 444-45.
113. Smith, 442 U.S. at 738.
114. Id. at 737.
115. Id. at 742.
116. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
117. Id. at 466 (holding that “the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search or
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”).
118. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
119. Id. at 358-59.
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to protect privacy against new technologies.”120 Moreover, recently in
121
Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that infrared searches of a
person’s home violate the Fourth Amendment.122 However, Kyllo
could be read as emphasizing the sanctity of a person’s home,123 rather
than enhancing Fourth Amendment protections against new
124
technologies. The Court did state, though, in Kyllo that “[i]t would
be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by
the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance
of technology.”125 Thus, Katz and Kyllo could indicate that courts126
will not ignore NSA’s technology searching capabilities, especially
considering that the NSA has “the largest computing power
concentrated at any one place in the whole world.”127
Another possible argument against Miller and Smith is that after
both cases were decided Congress enacted statutes to protect the
privacy of the records in each case. For example, after Miller and
Smith were decided, Congress enacted The Right to Financial Privacy
128
Act and Pen Register Act respectively. Moreover, since Miller and
Smith were decided, Congress has enacted the 1996
Telecommunications Act and 1986 Store Communications Act to

120. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and new Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 818 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, Fourth Amendment].
121. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
122. Id. at 40.
123. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 53638 (2005) [hereinafter Kerr, Searches and Seizures].
124. See Kerr, Fourth Amendment, supra note 120, at 835; but see Katz, 389 U.S. at 359
(stating that Fourth Amendment “considerations do not vanish when the search in question is
transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of [an outside
place] . . . . Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
125. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34.
126. Patricia L. Bellia, The Fourth Amendment and Emerging Communications
Technologies, IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY, May/June 2006, at 20-28, available at
http://www.computer.org/portal/site/security/menuitem.6f7b2414551cb84651286b108bcd45f3/ind
ex.jsp?&pName=security_level1_article&TheCat=1015&path=security/2006/v4n3&file=bellia.x
ml& (stating that “conclusions as to when an expectation of privacy is ‘reasonable,’ always
difficult for judges to make, are especially difficult with evolving technologies”).
127. Edwards, supra note 47 (quoting James Risen, Tim Russert Show (CNBC television
broadcast, February 25, 2006)) (emphasis added). The Court in Kyllo based its holding, in part,
on the fact the government used technology “not in general public use.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
Similarly, it is likely that the NSA has technology that is not publicly available to facilitate the
searching of call records.
128. Kerr, Fourth Amendment, supra note 120, at 855; Fred H. Cate, Legal Standards for
Data Mining, HUNTON & WILLIAMS 13 (August 19, 2005), available at
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/1250/Cate_Fourth_Amendment.pdf.
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protect customer phone records from unauthorized disclosure.129
Thus, taken as a whole, these statutes enacted by Congress indicate
that records released to a third-party have some constitutional
privacy value.
B. Prong Two: Societal Expectation of Privacy
Even after establishing the first prong, society would still have to
recognize the expectation as reasonable. This second prong would
face similar arguments as the first: namely, that society is not
prepared to recognize a privacy right in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. However, unlike both Miller and Smith,
here public opinion polls indicate that at least fifty-one percent of
130
Also, at least twenty classsociety objects to the call database.
action lawsuits have been filed against the government and
telecommunication providers, demonstrating society’s displeasure
with the disclosing and mining of call records.131 Thus, society may
one day be willing to recognize a privacy expectation in third-party
records that it was not prepared to recognize during the era of Miller
and Smith.
C. Reasonableness of the Search
Some commentators believe that a computer cannot perform a
132
Judge
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Richard Posner, for example, has stated that “processing of data
cannot . . . invade privacy. . . . This initial sifting, far from invading
privacy (a computer is not a sentient being), keeps most private data
from being read by any intelligence officer.”133 Another leading
Fourth Amendment scholar has advocated the “exposure-based
approach,” in which data is not search until it “is exposed to human
observation.”134

129. See generally, Lederman, supra note 10 (reasoning that “Smith v. Maryland is based on
the idea that phone users do not have a legitimate, reasonable expectation of privacy in who
they call. However, the fact that laws like the stored communications act . . . and other privacy
laws now exist give people a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information”).
130. See background discussion supra Part I.
131. Id.
132. See generally Jonathan Zittrain, Searches and Seizures in a Networked World, 119
HARV. L. REV. F. 83 (2006).
133. Posner, supra note 2.
134. Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 123, at 547-48.
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No perfect datamining program exists, and thus human eyes will
eventually view the data, resulting in a search that implicates the
135
Additionally, in the binary world, the NSA
Fourth Amendment.
could possibly perform a significant number of searches136 in what
would take the police a lifetime to perform in the physical world.
Moreover, unlike the physical world, where any search conducted
would require probable cause,137 the binary world has no judicial
138
oversight or statutory procedures to follow and consequently there
139
is a greater chance for abuse of power.
Further, unlike in the
physical world, the person in the binary world would have no notice140
141
Because there is no notice, a
that a search was even performed.
person could not deter the government through voting or political
pressure or even “regulate their behaviour to avoid unwanted
intrusions.”142 Thus, datamining should be considered a search and be
examined for reasonableness by balancing the government and
private interests.143 Mining a database so large lacks reasonableness

135. Zittrain, supra note 132, at 92.
136. See Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 123, at 534 (stating that “computer searches
involve entire virtual worlds of information”).
137. United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 571 (6th Cir. 2006).
138. Zittrain, supra note 132, at 91.
139. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972); see also 4&20
Blackbirds, Data Mining May be Legal—But is Still Repugnant, http://4and20blackbirds.word
press.com/2006/05/12/data-mining-may-be-legal-but-is-still repugnant/ (May 12, 2006, 5:55)
[hereinafter Blackbirds].
140. In the physical world, even with a search warrant the police are required, in most cases,
to “knock and announce” before entering a house. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934
(1995); but see Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2168 (2006) (holding that violating the
“knock and announce” rule will not result in the evidence being suppressed). Thus, some notice
is even required by officers before executing a search warrant on a home. In contrast, the
binary or digital world requires none even without a search warrant. While it is true that the
“knock and announce” rule is specific to the home, the purpose of the rule was to prevent
destruction of property and avoid violence just like providing notice to owners of the call
records could prevent the potential suspects from acting violently or destroying important
evidence relating to national security. Id. at 2165.
141. Zittrain, supra note 132, at 91-92; Blackbirds, supra note 139.
142. Gus Hosein et al., Invasive, Illusory, Illegal, and Illegitimate: Privacy International and
EDRi Response to the Consultation on a Framework Decision on Data Retention, Privacy
International, Sept. 15, 2004, http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/terrorism/rpt/response
toretention.html.
143. Reasonableness could not be determined based on when the Amendment was framed
because computer searching did not exist when the Fourth Amendment was enacted. Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)) (citations omitted) (“[W]here there was no clear
practice, either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the
constitutional provision was enacted, whether a particular search meets the reasonableness
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because it is inefficient, that is, many false positives are going to
occur, resulting in innocent people being jailed or suffering
144
reputational harm.
IV. GOVERNMENT’S DEFENSES
A. State Secrets Privilege
The state secrets privilege is a rule of evidence that makes
145
The
inadmissible any material detrimental to national security.
privilege can be invoked on two grounds. First, if there is a covert
espionage agreement with the government, then the court is
categorically barred (also known as the Totten bar) from hearing the
case.146 Second, if there is no categorical bar, then the court
determines (1) if the state secrets privilege has been properly
asserted, and (2) whether disclosure would be reasonably dangerous
to national security.147
The government is likely to argue that the Totten categorical bar
applies and ends the judicial inquiry, but this argument is misplaced.
The basis for this argument would be that the government and the
phone providers have an agreement in place,148 analogous to a covert
espionage agreement. However, implicit in Totten was that one who
makes a covert agreement agrees not to disclose the agreement, even
if breached.149 But, any potential challenger to the NSA call database
program would likely be a consumer who is not part of the
government-phone provider agreement and thus would not be
“bound by any implied covenant of secrecy.”150 Further, Totten is
standard ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”).
144. Stannard, supra note 8 (stating that “the problem with applying data mining techniques
to terrorism . . . is that terrorism is so rare, and the databases being mined are so large, that false
positives are inevitable and often more common than truly accurate results. And unlike using
data mining to spot credit card fraud, where at most a false positive triggers a worried call from
Visa to a cardholder and perhaps a temporary suspension of the card’s use, a false positive in a
terror investigation can put an innocent person in jail.”).
145. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp.2d 974, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
146. See id. at 980-81 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1876)).
147. Id. at 981-82 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953)).
148. See Cauley, supra note 3 (stating that “three telecommunications companies [AT&T,
BellSouth, and Verizon] are working under contract with the NSA.”); but see Page, Lawmakers,
supra note 11 (providing an update stating that “the newspaper cannot confirm that BellSouth
or Verizon contracted with the NSA to provide bulk calling records to that database”).
149. Hepting, 439 F. Supp.2d at 991.
150. Id. at 991.
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inapplicable here because it would result in the plaintiff’s case being
dismissed “based solely on the government’s conclusory statements
151
without any real judicial review.”
In contrast to the Totten categorical bar, the government can
likely assert the state secrets privilege under the second ground, as
both conditions are likely met. It likely has asserted the privilege
152
correctly, and there have been no public disclosures meaning that
any future disclosures could potentially be dangerous to national
security.153 The court in Hepting v. AT&T Corp.154 agreed that both
conditions were met, and the privilege applies. However, the court
reluctantly reached this conclusion because NSA public disclosures
about other security programs may have alerted any potential
155
terrorists to the call database. In fact, the court even warned that if
any public disclosures occurred accidentally or deliberately later on,
then those disclosures might preclude the government from asserting
the state secrets privilege.156
B. The President’s Authority to Bypass FISA
1. Government’s Arguments. The President could first argue
that he has express authority to override the FISA procedures and
create the NSA call database. Section 1809(a)(1) provides that any
electronic surveillance “authorized by statute” is exempt from the
157
FISA procedures. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force
158
(AUMF) could provide such authorization, as it states that the
151. Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp.2d 899, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2006); see also Hamdi v
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion) (stating, “Whatever power the United
States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with
enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches
when individual liberties are at stake.”).
152. The Supreme Court has held that to properly assert the state secrets privilege there
must be “[1] formal claims of privilege, [2] lodged by the head of the department which has
control over the matter, [3] after actual personal consideration by that officer.” United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953). All the requirements are likely to be met here.
153. See Hepting, 439 F. Supp.2d at 991, 997-98 (allowing the state secrets privilege based on
the lack of any public disclosures); Terkel, 441 F. Supp.2d at 901 (stating that “there have been
no public disclosures of the existence or non-existence” of the call database).
154. 439 F.Supp.2d at 991.
155. Id. at 997.
156. Id. at 991, 997-98.
157. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (2000).
158. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001). Also see the joint resolution to authorize the use of military forces in Iraq, which states
that the “President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines
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President is to “use all necessary and appropriate force . . . to prevent
159
any future acts of . . . terrorism against the United States.”
Secondly, the President could argue that the Supreme Court, in
160
held that government action that is a
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
“fundamental incident of waging war” is authorized by the AUMF’s
“necessary and appropriate force” clause.161 Because intelligence
gathering is a significant part of combat, the NSA’s collection and
mining of call records to prevent terrorist threats would be authorized
by the AUMF’s force clause.162 Third, and finally, it could also be
argued that the Constitution provides the President with inherent
163
authority to bypass FISA and create the NSA call database.
2. Analysis. The first argument that the AUMF overrides
FISA is not supported by FISA’s text, which states that FISA “shall
be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . may be
164
One court has stated that the exclusivity language
conducted.”
“makes it impossible for the President to ‘opt-out’ of the legislative
scheme.”165 It is a settled canon of statutory interpretation that
166
general provisions are superseded by specific provisions. FISA does
not permit domestic electronic surveillance without a warrant, but the
AUMF allows the President to use all “necessary and appropriate

to be necessary and appropriate in order to . . . defend the national security of the United States
against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” as another possible source of express congressional
authority. Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, § 3, 116 Stat. 1498, 1501 (2002).
159. Authorization for Use of Military Force, § 2.
160. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
161. Id. at 519; Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazen & Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative
Attorneys, Cong. Research Serv., on Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic
Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information, (Jan. 5, 2006) (available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/issues/Eavesdropping/CRS%20report%20Jan%205%202006.pdf)
[hereinafter Congressional Research Service].
162. This type of authority could be called “modified-express” because the President would
have express authority from Congress, but only for actions that are a “fundamental incident of
waging war.”
163. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1(stating that “the executive power shall be vested in a
President”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (stating that “the President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy.”).
164. 18 U.S.C.S. §2511 (2)(f) (LexisNexis 2002) (emphasis added).
165. United States v. Andonian, 735 F. Supp. 1469, 1474 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d in part and
remanded, 29 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995).
166. PresstheNews.Com, The NSA Wiretap Program Violates FISA, and the Constitution’s
Separation of Powers Clauses, http://www.pressthenews.com/wt3.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2006)
[hereinafter The NSA Wiretap Program].
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force.”167 Thus, it would take a strained reading to find that the
168
AUMF’s general provision overrides FISA’s specific language
requiring a warrant for domestic surveillance. Notwithstanding
FISA’s text, it is unlikely that gathering and datamining numerous
call records constitutes the “necessary and appropriate force”
required to invoke the AUMF. 169
Similarly, the second argument for Presidential authority, relying
on Hamdi, is also misplaced. While it is true that intelligence
acquisition is an important part of any combat, “it is not clear that the
170
collection of intelligence constitutes a use of force.” In Hamdi, the
Court held that the AUMF authorized the detention of a United
States citizen even though the Non-Detention Act provided that a
United States citizen could not be detained unless Congress
authorized it.171 Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality of the
court, found that the AUMF does not support “indefinite detention
172
Thus, the Court seemed to be
for the purpose of interrogation.”
indicating that intelligence gathering is not a necessary or appropriate
force. Accordingly, because the NSA call database is for intelligence
purposes, it would likely not constitute the use of force authorized by
the AUMF’s “necessary and appropriate force” clause.
Third, the argument that the President has inherent authority is
also unlikely to succeed. When President Carter signed FISA into
law, he stated that the bill “clarifie[d] the Executive’s authority to
gather foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance in the United
173
States.” Thus, even the President responsible for approving FISA
acknowledged that FISA limits the President’s authority to conduct
174
While it could be argued that the
electronic surveillance.
President’s authority is heightened during a time of conflict, the

167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See Congressional Research Service, supra note 161.
170. Id.
171. Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).
172. See id. at 521.
173. Letter from the Ctr. For Constitutional Rights to the Senate Intelligence Comm. (May
17, 2006) (available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/report.asp?ObjID=5hgZvLHaDC&
Content=776).
174. Additionally, it could be argued that when Congress amended FISA in 2001, a month
after the AUMF was adopted, it implicitly recognized that the AUMF does not bypass FISA.
Posting by Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1135029722.shtml
(Dec. 19, 2005, 4:02 PM) [hereinafter Kerr, Legal Analysis]; The NSA Wiretap Program, supra
note 166.
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Court in Hamdi stated that “a state of war is not a blank check for the
President” and that all three branches should be involved when civil
175
Thus, Hamdi indicated that the President’s
liberties are at stake.
inherent authority is circumscribed even during a time of war.
V. WOULD THE CALL DATABASE BE LEGAL IN CANADA,
THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND AUSTRALIA?
An analysis of the NSA call database under Canadian, British,
and Australian law could provide176 insight into American law and
177
how to improve it, especially considering the degree to which
privacy rights vary from country to country.178 For example, Privacy
International, a privacy watchdog group,179 ranked Canada as having
180
It ranked Australia and
“significant protections and safeguards.”
the United Kingdom as having “systemic failure to uphold
safeguards” and an “endemic surveillance societ[y],” respectively,181
while the United States received an “[e]xtensive surveillance
societ[y]” ranking. This indicates that much can be learned by
evaluating the collection and mining of call records and the balances

175. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.
176. One scholar has evaluated the NSA call database, in general, under both German and
French law and concluded that the NSA call database would be illegal in both countries. This
conclusion was based, in part, on the fact that (1) the government would have access to a
significant amount of data; (2) the government would hold the data for a long period of time; (3)
citizens would have no ability to determine how their data is being used; and (4) there would be
no independent agency to oversee the government’s program. Francesca Bignami, European
Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Anti-Terrorism Data-Mining, 48
B.C. L. REV. 609, 649-62 (2007).
177. It has been stated that evaluating the NSA call database in other countries is important
because “it could undermine transatlantic cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Some
European laws forbid the transfer of public security and law enforcement data to countries
without adequate privacy protection.” Posting by Francesca Bignami to Concurring Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/05/the_nsa_phone_c.html (May 29, 2006,
03:51 EST).
178. The purpose of this part is to use the facts from the NSA call database in the United
States as the foundation for the international analysis in Canada, the United Kingdom, and
Australia. Thus, all the facts from the background found in Part I of this Note are assumed.
179. Privacy International, About Privacy International, http://www.privacyinternational.org
(last visited Feb. 12, 2007) (stating that “Privacy International . . . is a human rights group
formed in 1990 as a watchdog on surveillance and privacy invasions by governments and
corporations”).
180. Privacy International, Leading Surveillance Societies in the EU and the World, Feb. 11,
2006, http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-545269.
181. Id.
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that other countries strike between national security and privacy
182
rights.
A. Canada
183

In 2001, Canada enacted the
1. Obtaining Phone Records.
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
184
(PIPEDA) to protect an individual’s privacy interests and to
185
Specifically, §
prevent “secret information gathering practices.”
7(3) of PIPEDA prevents personal information,186 such as phone
records, from being disclosed by a telecommunication provider
187
without consent, subpoena, warrant, or court order. However, the
national security clause of PIPEDA allows disclosure to the
government without the individual’s consent when the government
has “identified its [1] lawful authority to obtain the information and
. . . (i) it suspects that the information [2] relates to national
security.”188
PIPEDA does not define “lawful authority” or what authority is
necessary for “obtaining and possessing the information.”189
However, an Ontario court has recently attempted to interpret
190
In that case, the police requested an internet
“lawful authority.”
subscriber’s information from Bell Canada under PIPEDA,191 citing

182. The international discussion does not address the possibly higher level of privacy
imposed by the various states or provinces’ statutes or common-law privacy within each country.
Moreover, this part does not discuss possible defenses available to each country’s government.
183. Currently, Canada has proposed federal legislation called The Modernization of
Investigative Techniques Act (MITA). Canadian Security, Do You Know Where Your Data is
Stored?, http://www.canadiansecuritymag.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id
=245&Itemid=5 (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). MITA “will permit law enforcement to request any
information about a subscriber from a communications provider, without requiring judicial
authorization.” Id. (emphasis added).
184. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 S.C., ch.5 (Can.)
[hereinafter PIPEDA].
185. Arthur J. Cockfield, Who Watches the Watchers? A Law and Technology Perspective on
Government and Private Sector Surveillance, 29 QUEEN’S L.J. 364, 405 (2003).
186. Section 2 of PIPEDA defines “personal information” as “information about an
identifiable individual.” PIPEDA § 2.
187. Jonathon Gatehouse, You are Exposed, MACLEANS.CA, Nov. 21, 2005,
http://www.macleans.ca/canada/national/article.jsp?content=20051121_115779_115779.
188. PIPEDA § 7(3)(cl.1) (emphasis added).
189. In re S.C., [2006] O.J. No. 3754 (Ont.).
190. Id.
191. See id.
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an ongoing investigation as its authority for the information.192 Based
on this authority, Bell Canada provided the information without a
193
warrant. The court held that an ongoing criminal investigation does
not constitute “lawful authority,” and that a warrant was necessary to
obtain the subscriber information under PIPEDA because the
individual held a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.194
This case indicates that the government must have more than a
mere suspicion of wrongdoing before it is acting with the requisite
“lawful authority.” Here, it is doubtful that the government has met
the “lawful authority” burden, as it will not know until after the
records are mined or searched whether they are relevant to any
195
If collection was allowed, it would be based on
wrongdoing.
nothing more than a “fishing expedition.” While it is true that call
records, unlike the subscriber information, do not implicate the same
expectation of privacy, it is arguable that a person does have at least
some expectation of privacy in records disclosed to third parties, as
will be discussed.
Besides the lawful authority requirement, the national security
clause also requires the government to “suspect[] that the information
196
[obtained] relates to national security.” National security is difficult
197
to define and the definition is not found within PIPEDA; however,
198
a Supreme Court of Canada decision in 2002 may be read “as . . .
[signaling] a limited role for the courts in policing the exercise of
199
executive branch” in determining what constitutes national security.
Notwithstanding this possible limited role by courts, it is unlikely the
government had enough suspicion as required by the national security
clause to justify the acquisition of phone records.
Any suspicion likely requires some investigation by the
government to determine whether the information relates to national

192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. See Letter from Electronic Frontier to Lawful Access Consultation (Dec. 17, 2002)
(available at http://www.efc.ca/pages/surveillance/lawful.doc).
196. PIPEDA, 2000 S.C., ch.5 § 7(3)(cl.1) (emphasis added).
197. Craig Forcese, Through a Glass Darkly: The Role and Review of “National Security”
Concepts in Canadian Law, 43 ALBERTA L. REV. 963 (2006) (stating that “national security is
not defined in any of the other privacy-limiting statutes”).
198. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3.
199. Forcese, supra note 197.
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security.200 This is necessary to ensure that a person’s privacy is
protected and that the government is not arbitrarily obtaining the
information without some justification. Further, this suspicion
requirement also protects a person from the stigma attached to being
mistakenly labeled a national security suspect. Thus, because the
request for call records would not be predicated on any suspicion,201
there would be no nexus to national security justifying the request.
In addition to PIPEDA, the Canadian Privacy Act (CPA)
requires that the government minimize the collection of personal
information202 and have a demonstrable need for it.203 CPA is similar
to PIPEDA, except that it is concerned with government entities as
opposed to private ones. Section 4 of the CPA provides that personal
information should not be collected except when it relates to a
government program;204 § 5(1), in contrast, requires that information
be collected, if possible, directly from the person.205 Thus, for similar
reasons discussed under PIPEDA, and the fact that the data
collection would not be minimized, the government could not feasibly
collect call records from the phone providers.
2. Datamining the Call Records. The next issue is whether
datamining the call records would violate § 8 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter), which states that a person has
206
a right to be protected against “unreasonable search and seizure.”
The analysis under § 8, like that under the Fourth Amendment, is
divided into two prongs: first, does the person have a reasonable

200. In Re Ontario Power Generation Inc. and Society of Energy Prof’ls, [2004] C.L.A.S.J.
9606 para. 28 (Ont.) (holding that the information required by the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission was “predicated upon the need to do so for national security reasons”).
201. See background discussion supra Part I.
202. Section 2 defines personal information as “information about an identifiable
individual.” Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P 21 (1985) (Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Privacy Act].
203. News Release, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Privacy Commissioner
releases finding on video surveillance by RCMP in Kelowna (Oct. 4, 2001) (available at
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/media/nr-c/02_05_b_011004_e.asp).
204. Canadian Privacy Act § 4.
205. Id. Section 8(2) provides numerous exceptions for when an agency can disclose (not
collect) personal information to another government agency. This section focuses on whether
the Canadian government could collect the personal information in the first instance from the
telecommunications provider and not whether it could obtain the data from some other
government agency. See id. § 8(2).
206. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, para. 8,
being Sched. B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
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expectation of privacy in his or her phone records; 207 and second, is
208
datamining those phone records reasonable.
a. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy.
The first prong
potentially contains a number of factors that are relevant in
determining whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
209
First, it is relevant whether the
in his or her phone records.
210
information was disclosed to a third-party. Unlike American law,
where the Supreme Court has held that a person does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in any records disclosed to a third211
party, the “Charter jurisprudence acknowledges the persistence of
constitutionally protected interests in information disclosed to third
parties.”212 For example, a person in Canada has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in information provided to a physician and
information provided to a third-party regarding a sexual assault.213
Thus, in contrast with American law, under Canadian law, a privacy
expectation is not automatically lost when information is disclosed to
a third-party custodian.214
A second factor is the place where the search occurred and the
215
The Canadian Supreme Court has
technology used in the search.
suggested that government searching of third-party records is not as
216
constitutionally protected as the searching of a person’s home. This
may be true, but it does not necessarily follow that individuals have
no expectation of privacy in their records.217 Moreover, the place of
the search is not constitutionally determinative because § 8 “protects
218
people, not places.” As for the technology used in the search, the
ability of datamining programs to search vast quantities of data in
minutes is constitutionally problematic.

207. See Wayne N. Renke, Who Controls the Past Now Controls the Future: CounterTerrorism, Data Mining and Privacy, 43 ALBERTA L. REV. 779, 800 (2006).
208. See id at 810.
209. Id. at 800-01.
210. Id. at 803.
211. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
742 (1979).
212. Renke, supra note 207, at 803.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 806-07, 809.
216. Id. at 806 (citing R v. Plant, [1993] S.C.R. 281, 295).
217. Id. at 807.
218. Id.
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A third factor in the reasonable privacy expectation calculus is
219
This factor requires determining the
the individual’s conduct.
220
context or reason for disclosure by the individual. After a call is
made, phone providers automatically create call records.221 However,
“[m]ost Canadians consider their call records privileged
222
information” and thus do not believe they are making any public
disclosure when a call is placed. Accordingly, the acquisition of call
records by the government from the phone providers is likely an
involuntary disclosure.
Fourth, the nature of the information may be another important
223
factor. Generally, the “greater the relevance of the information to
the ‘biographical core’ of the individual, to the ‘intimate details’ of
224
the individual’s life . . . the stronger the expectation of privacy.”
Although call records do not appear to identify biographical core
information, the Canadian Criminal Code “establishes a procedure
for the issuance of a warrant to install a device and record this
information.”225 Thus, the Criminal Code provision is evidence that
call records have some constitutional value.
The final factor is the relationship between the custodian
(government or phone provider) and the individual.226 Both PIPEDA
and the CPA statutorily require that the custodian protect private
227
information such as call records. Based on these statutes, it is likely
that a person would reasonably rely on them to protect his privacy
expectations.
b. Is Datamining the Call Records Reasonable? In analyzing
the second prong, whether datamining is reasonable, there are five
potentially relevant factors to consider. The first is the purpose of the
228
datamining. Here, the purpose of the mining would be to prevent
terrorist acts, which is unquantifiably important. Datamining without
any purpose other than to protect the monolithic category of
“national security” should not suffice. Response to terrorism
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 801.
Id.
Diamond & Cauley, supra note 5.
Gatehouse, supra note 187.
Renke, supra note 207, at 803-04.
Id. at 803; R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 492.2 (1985).
Renke, supra note 207, at 804.
See id. at 804-06.
Id. at 804-05.
See id. at 811-12.
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sometimes means that the government must move quickly, such as in
229
an emergency, but when an emergency exists, the constitutional
protections of the Charter should not be sacrificed.
230
The second factor looks at whether the datamining is effective.
The individuals in the call database were not selected based on an
investigation. Thus, many false positives are likely to result,
especially considering the size of the database, which involves
millions of people. Moreover, the patterns that emerge from the
mining depend on the suspect maintaining a similar history, but “as
adversaries change strategy, their patterns of past behavior fail to
provide clues to future activities.”231 Finally, the patterns that do
emerge may be questionable for the simple reason that the dataset
supporting the pattern is not large enough (lack of suspects) to make
any accurate statistical predictions.232
A third factor in the reasonableness calculus is the
233
intrusiveness of mining the data. The Canadian Supreme Court has
stated that the scope of invasion can make a search unreasonable,
especially when the people searched are not under any
investigation.234 The American call database, however, would likely
involve millions of targets and a person’s call records being
repeatedly searched.
In addition to the purpose, effectiveness, and intrusiveness of
datamining, another factor to consider is whether there is any
235
Oversight aids in eliminating any
oversight of the datamining.
potential distrust between the people searched and the government.236
As discussed previously, the NSA call database lacks any appearance
of oversight, as the program was created secretly and without the
input from the people’s representatives.237 Thus, Canadians would
probably distrust datamining more than if they were informed about
the data searching before it occurred. It could be argued that giving
notice to people would completely destroy the national security

229. See id.
230. Id. at 816-17.
231. Data mining, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_mining (last visited Feb.
14, 2007).
232. Id.
233. Renke, supra note 207, at 813-14.
234. Id. at 813 (citing R v. Thompson, [1990] S.C.R. 1111, 1143-44).
235. Id. at 820.
236. See id.
237. Page, NSA Secret Database, supra note 2.

05__MACARTHUR.DOC

470

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

10/4/2007 9:55:02 AM

[Vol 17:441

purpose, as possible terrorists would alter their plans. However, this
argument ignores that there are alternative ways to prevent tipping
off the potential terrorists, but at the same time providing the
requisite notice. For instance, the government could limit the call
records to known investigations of terrorist suspects or call records
for which the government has a warrant.
The final consideration in determining the reasonableness of the
238
It is possible that one
search is the potential misuse of the data.
agency could make the call database available to other agencies,239
thereby allowing them to obtain call records about a person without
any investigation or probable cause. Moreover, hackers could
penetrate the government’s security and consequently share that
240
The size of the
information almost instantly with the world.
database makes these threats even more serious.
B. United Kingdom
1. Obtaining Phone Records. In December of 2001, the British
Parliament approved the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
241
ATCSA allows the government to request that
(ATCSA).
communication providers retain their data242 for national security
purposes or for preventing crimes that relate to national security.243
In addition to ATCSA, the United Kingdom has also enacted the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), which controls “the
acquisition and disclosure of data relating to communications.”244
Specifically, under § 22(2) of RIPA, a number of government groups
can access personal information outside of national security for such
things as the collection of taxes.245
238. Renke, supra note 207, at 818-19.
239. See id. at 819.
240. See id. at 819-20.
241. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 (U.K.) [hereinafter ATCSA];
see also PRIVACY INT’L, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2005, at 661, 726 (2005), available at
http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2005/PHR2005swed-ven.pdf [hereinafter PRIVACY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS].
242. Whether the retention is illegal under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) is beyond the scope of this Note. See Hosein et al., supra note 142 (arguing that
data retention would be illegal because it would interfere with Article 8 of ECHR—“the right to
respect for his or her private life”—by accumulating a large amount of private data).
243. ATCSA, pt. 11; PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 241, at 726.
244. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 (U.K.) [hereinafter RIPA].
245. Ben Emmerson, Q.C. & Helen Mountfield, Counsel to the Info. Comm’r, AntiTerrorism, Crime And Security Act 2001 Retention And Disclosure Of Communications Data
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As a result of both ATCSA and RIPA, data can be retained for
national security purposes, but can be accessed by a wide variety of
public groups for “purposes . . . which extend substantially beyond
issues concerning national security.”246 In fact, the Home Office247
stated in 2002 that under RIPA more than “1,000 different
government departments including local authorities, health,
environmental, trade departments and many other public authorities”
248
had access to the communications data.
Through these acts, the British government has already created
something like the call database. The telecommunication providers
can be required to retain the call records and many governmental
units have access to them. Thus, the acquisition of call records by the
government would likely be legal under British law.
2. Datamining the Call Records. It has been claimed by some
commentators that even though the United Kingdom’s anti-terrorism
legislation does not address datamining, it “is already widely used in
249
the United Kingdom to combat terrorism.” Further, it would seem
incongruent to have broad laws enabling the retention of data, but
not allowing the mining of that data. Thus, a final question that needs
to be addressed is whether the U.K. government could permissibly
search the call records.
Like many other European Countries, the United Kingdom has
250
adopted the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Summary Of Counsels’ Advice, para. 4, http://www.privacyinternational.org/countries/uk/
surveillance/ic-terror-opinion.htm [hereinafter Counsels’ Advice] (stating that the RIPA
“permits a range of public authorities to obtain access to such communications data for a wide
variety of public interest purposes . . . which extend substantially beyond issues concerning
national security”). Section 22(2) of the RIPA lists eight possible reasons for the government to
obtain communication data. RIPA § 22(2).
246. Counsels’ Advice, supra note 245.
247. The Home Office is “responsible for keeping the UK safe from any threat to . . .
national security . . . [by working] with the police and security agencies.” Home Office,
Security, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
248. PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 241, at 726.
249. John Yoo, Catching Terrorists: The British System versus the U.S. System, AM. INST.
FOR PUB. POL’Y RES., Sept. 18, 2006, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.24903/
pub_detail.asp; see generally Kendra Gilbert, Gregg: Fight Terrorism like the British, THE
UNION LEADER (N.H.), Sept. 15, 2006, at A7 (stating that some believe “the U.S. government
[should] emulate Britain’s more lenient restrictions on data mining”) (emphasis added).
250. See generally DANIEL C. PREFONTAINE, THE INT’L CTR. FOR CRIMINAL LAW REFORM
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY, IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN ENFORCING THE LAW AND RESPECTING
THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 5 (2001), available at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/
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Under Article 8(1), “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his
251
This has been read as the right to be free from
private . . . .life.”
government interference except when the government’s interference
is “in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
252
in the interests of national security.”
The first question is whether the search of call records amounts
to an interference requiring the government to justify its actions.
Article 8’s reference to private life means that a person has a right to
253
Searching call
seek and form relationships with other individuals.
records could chill the use of phones to communicate with others and
accordingly would interfere with the private life protected by Article
8.254 It could be argued that no interference exists because the data
255
searched is limited to non-content communications data. However,
this argument ignores that the “European Court of Human Rights has
repeatedly found the recording of numbers [dialed] from
conventional telephones to constitute an interference with private
life.” 256 Moreover, after considering the scope of the call database,
the interference is significant, even conceding that only non-content
information is being searched.
Although there may be interference, the government may not
have violated Article 8 if the interference is “in accordance with the
257
In 2000, the
law . . . and necessary in a democratic society.”
European Commission on Human Rights (the precursor to the
258
European Court of Human Rights), in Khan v. United Kingdom,
discussed the meaning of “in accordance with law.” In Khan, the
court stated:

Reports/International_Standards.pdf. In 1998, the U.K. Parliament adopted The Human Rights
Act, which contains three points regarding the ECHR: (1) the government cannot violate
Convention rights unless, through an Act of Parliament, it had no choice; (2) U.K. legislation
should be interpreted to fit within the ECHR; (3) individuals can seek a remedy from a U.K.
court instead of using the European Court of Human Rights. Dep’t for Constitutional Affairs,
General Information on the Human Rights Act 1998, http://www.dca.gov.uk/peoplesrights/human-rights/faqs.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
251. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8(1),
Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter ECHR].
252. Id. art. 8(2).
253. See Hosein et al., supra note 142.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. ECHR, supra note 251, art. 8(2).
258. App. No. 35394/97, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 45 (2001) (Commission Report).
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[T]he phrase “in accordance with the law” not only requires
compliance with domestic law but relates to the quality of that
law . . . the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give
individuals an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which
and the conditions on which public authorities are entitled to resort
259
to such covert measures.

Khan requires the existence of a domestic law that sanctions the
interference and a law that allows individuals to foresee when the
260
government can interfere in their private lives. This foreseeability
function permits individuals to adjust or alter their conduct to avoid
the possible interference.261 Without this notice, for example, an
individual may be penalized for previously legal conduct. Even if the
United Kingdom enacted laws that authorized datamining to prevent
terrorism, the laws would still have to be sufficiently public to put the
citizens on notice, which did not happen based on the alleged facts
from the NSA call database. Thus, the United Kingdom’s action of
datamining would likely not be “in accordance with the law.”
Even though the government’s datamining is not “in accordance
with the law,” it is still valuable to discuss whether the datamining “is
necessary in a democratic society.” The European Court on Human
Rights has interpreted this phrase to mean that the interference has
to be proportionate (or no more than necessary) to a “legitimate aim
pursued” and must “correspond to a pressing social need.”262
In considering how the call database would fare under U.K. law,
the proportionality requirement is not met because the United
Kingdom has no mechanisms in place to limit the interference. First,
the government did not restrict its datamining to the call records of
suspected terrorists. Instead, the government mined the records of
individuals merely because they made a domestic phone call. Second,
if the government does not destroy the call records after mining, then
263
it would be continually interfering with a person’s life because the

259. Id. at para. 26 (emphasis added); see generally Alisdair A. Gillespie, The Legal Use of
Participating Informers, WEB J. OF CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (2000), http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/
2000/issue5/gillespie5.html.
260. Khan, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 45, para. 26.
261. Hosein et al., supra note 142.
262. Id. See also, e.g., Case C-441/02, Comm’n v. Germany, 2006 E.C.R. I-03449 para. 109
(The European Court of Justice stated that for something to be “necessary in a democratic
society,” it must be “justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued.”); Case C-540/03, Parliament v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. I-8667.
263. In Re S. v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [2004] UKHL 39 (“The general tenor
of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court of Human Rights) and
European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission) is that the retention, keeping or
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retention of data would allow any government agency to perform
264
surveillance at will. Finally, one person’s records may be searched
multiple times without any oversight procedures to ensure the search
is limited. Accordingly, it is unlikely that datamining by the U.K.
government “is necessary in a democratic society.”
In addition to the ECHR, there is a British domestic law that
265
protects data processing called the Data Protection Act. This Act
266
applies to personal data processing done by government and private
organizations. 267 The Act contains eight principles illustrating how
268
The Act, however, is not
personal data should be processed.
considered effective because “[t]here are many problems with
enforcing rules on access to information, especially relating to
269
computer technologies.”
Moreover, a recent Court of Appeals
decision has narrowed the meaning of “personal information” and
thus restricted the possible privacy protections under the Act.270 It is
therefore likely that the ECHR rather than the domestic law provides
more protection against unlawful datamining.

storage of private information by state institutions is an interference with art. 8(1) rights.”); see
also Hosein et al., supra note 142.
264. See id. (stating “that citizens should have notice of the circumstances in which the State
may conduct surveillance, so that they can regulate their behaviour to avoid unwanted
intrusions”).
265. Data Protection Act, 1998 (U.K.) [hereinafter DPA]; PRIVACY INT’L, UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND 2003, available at
http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2003/countries/unitedkingdom.htm [hereinafter
UNITED KINGDOM]; Spy Blog, RFID Data Protection Guidance from the Information
Commissioner, http://p10.hostingprod.com/@spyblog.org.uk/blog/2006/09/rfid_data_protection_
guidance.html (Sept. 28, 2006, 11:57 AM) (stating that “[t]he Data Protection Act 1998 concerns
the processing of personal data”).
266. DPA pt. 1, § 1 (defining “personal data,” in part, as “data which relate to a living
individual who can be identified . . . from those data”).
267. UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 265.
268. See Margaret Smith, The Privacy of Personal Information and Electronic Commerce—
Recent Developments, GOV’T OF CAN. PUBLICATIONS, May 31, 2000, available at http://dsppsd.communication.gc.ca/Pilot/LoPBdP/BP/prb0005-e.htm.
269. UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 265 (emphasis added); Anne Lenoir, Privacy and Data
Protection Act 2007, BBC ACTION NETWORK, Dec. 19, 2006, http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/
actionnetwork/A4446038 (arguing the Data Protection Act of 1998 does not protect the right of
privacy).
270. Data protection case goes to the House of Lords, OUT-LAW NEWS, June 16, 2005,
http://www.out-law.com/page-5820; Jason Lysandrides, UK Government Given Formal Warning
by Commission, LAWDIT READING ROOM, http://www.lawdit.co.uk/reading_room/room/
view_article.asp?name=../articles/Privacy%20developments%20-%20draftv2.htm (last visited
Jan. 15, 2007) (stating the European Commission issued a formal warning to the U.K.
government because “the narrow interpretation given . . . of personal data . . . [does] not
adequately reflect the broader intention of the [European Union]”).
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C. Australia
1. Obtaining Phone Records. In 1997, Australia enacted the
Telecommunications Act, which “contains a number of provisions
271
dealing with the privacy of personal information held by” providers.
Under Part 13 of that Act, it is presumed that a consumer’s phone
272
One such
records are confidential unless an exception applies.
exception allows disclosure to an Australian Security Intelligence
Organization (ASIO) agent when it is authorized “in writing by the
Director-General of Security” (DGS) and the disclosure relates to the
ASIO functions.273
The DGS could potentially authorize the
telecommunication providers to disclose millions of call records.
However, it is unlikely that the DGS would make such certification
equivalent to the American database, because it is doubtful that such
a broad request would relate to ASIO functions.274
Even without the ASIO exception, it may still be possible for the
Australian government to obtain the call records through the
Telecommunications Act by leveraging records already obtained
through other agencies.275 The Act permits disclosure to the
government for the “enforcement of the criminal law.”276 In 2001,
approximately 750,000 call records were released to governmental
277
units, and in 1999-2000 almost one million disclosures of records
271. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner, http://www.privacy.gov.au/act/
telecom/index.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
272. PRIVACY INT’L, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (2003), http://www.privacy
international.org/survey/phr2003/countries/australia.htm (stating that “[t]he Telecommunications Act
1997 contains a detailed list of ‘exceptions’ from a basic presumption of confidentiality of customer
records”). Part 13 § 276(1)(a) of the 1997 Telecommunications Act prohibits disclosure of
information that relates to the communication substance unless an exception applies.
Telecommunications Act, 1997, pt. 13, § 276(1)(a) (Austl.). Because call records contain data that
relates to the substance of the communication such as where the call was made, those records would
likely qualify as information that could not be disclosed without an exception.
273. Telecommunications Act, pt. 13, § 283.
274. But see infra note 277 (discussing that a substantial number of call records have been
disclosed to the ASIO).
275. This analysis assumes that the other agencies have kept a repository or database of call
records once obtained from the telecommunication provider and have not erased these records.
276. Telecommunications Act, pt. 13, § 282.
277. Velcro, supra note 22; see Protection of Communications: Telecommunications Act 1997
(C’th), ELECTRONIC FRONTIERS AUSTL., Oct. 12, 2006, http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/
Privacy/ta.html (stating that “[t]he Australian Communications Authority has confirmed that
telecommunications companies . . . [disclosed] information to law-enforcement and other
government agencies 998,548 times in 1999-2000. . . . The extraordinary access to phone records
does not include information given to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, which is
believed to be substantial and which the agency is not obliged to disclose. The information
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were made under the Act.278 Moreover, any agency that gives call
records or personal information to an intelligence agency would be
279
exempt from the requirements of the Federal Privacy Act, which
limits the collection of personal information by the government.280
Thus, the police and other agencies could obtain the call records and
then transfer those records to an intelligence agency in a manner
similar to the FBI acquiring and transferring call records to the NSA.
In addition to the Telecommunications Act of 1997, the amended
2001 Federal Privacy Act limits the government’s ability to acquire
call records.281 This Act includes National Privacy Principles (NPP) 282
and Information Privacy Principles (IPP),283 but unlike the NPPs,
which apply to private organizations, the IPPs apply to government
284
Specifically, NPP 2 states that a telecommunication
agencies.

revealed included telephone accounts, numbers dialled, the time calls were made and their
duration, and use of the Internet. These disclosures were made at a rate of more than 19,000 a
week, or nearly 4000 on any working day.”) (emphasis added).
278. Inquiry into The Law Enforcement Implications of New Technology, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIERS AUSTL., Apr. 19, 2001, http://www.efa.org.au/Publish/ncasub.html.
279. Part 2, § 7(1) of the Privacy Act states that a “record that has originated with, or has
been received from . . . an intelligence agency” is exempt from the Privacy Act. Privacy Act,
1988, as amended 2006, pt. 2, § 7(1) (Austl.); see Roger Clark, The Australian Privacy Act 1988
as an Implementation of the OECD Data Protection Guidelines, THE AUSTL. NAT’L U., June 25,
1989, available at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/PActOECD.html (stating
that § 7(1) has “the effect that any record whatsoever can be permanently removed from the
individual’s sight by passing the data to an intelligence agency for its consideration and return.
Any material that an agency wishes to keep from a data subject can therefore be protected.”).
280. Matthew Kohel, Note, The Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Bill 2000: The
Australian Government’s Substandard Attempt to Allay Privacy Concerns and Regulate Internet
Privacy in the Private Sector, 27 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 703, 703-04 (2002) (stating that “[t]he
Privacy Act was Australia’s attempt to regulate how personal information is collected,
transferred and disposed of in the public sector”).
281. It is true that the Telecommunications Act of 1997 and the Amended Privacy Act of
2001 would seem to overlap, however, the “[c]overage of the National Privacy Principles in the
Privacy legislation is broader than Part 13 of the Telecommunications Act.” Holly Raiche,
Telecommunications Privacy—The Interaction of the Privacy and Telecommunications
Regulatory Systems, THE NEW AUSTL. PRIVACY LANDSCAPE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.
SEMINAR (Mar. 14, 2001) available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/PrivLRes/2001/4.html.
282. Office of Legislative Drafting, Extracted from the Privacy Act 1988,
http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/npps01.pdf (last visited June 14, 2007) [hereinafter
National Privacy Principles].
283. The Information Privacy Principles are a part of the 1988 Privacy Act. Privacy Act,
1988 (Austl.) [hereinafter Information Privacy Principles].
284. See The Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Federal Privacy Law,
http://www.privacy.gov.au/act/index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2007) (stating that in Australia,
“[t]he Federal Privacy Act contains eleven Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) which apply to
Commonwealth and ACT government agencies. It also has ten National Privacy Principles
(NPPs) which apply to parts of the private sector and all health service providers.”). Therefore,
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provider “must not . . . disclose personal information285 about an
individual for a purpose (the secondary purpose) other than the
286
primary purpose of collection” unless an exception applies.
The primary purpose of the collection of the call records by the
telecommunication providers will probably be for billing even though
other purposes may be listed in the standard phone contract. It is
highly unlikely that phone providers collect call records primarily for
national security. Thus, the phone providers could not disclose
personal information unless it was for billing purposes.
Although NPP 2 prohibits disclosure of call records, it still allows
disclosure for a secondary purpose if an exception applies. It is
unlikely that the phone providers could have a secondary purpose
because “there must be a strong[] connection between the . . .
disclosure and the primary purpose for collection.”287 A national
security purpose would not have a strong connection to billing and
therefore not qualify as a secondary purpose.
Even assuming that the phone providers had an arguable
secondary purpose, none of the exceptions list in NPP 2.1(a)-(h)
because the Federal Privacy Act “does not regulate state or territory agencies, except for the
ACT,” any analysis of the call database would have to be done under each state’s privacy laws,
which is beyond the scope of this Note. Office of Privacy Commissioner, State & Territory
Privacy Laws, http://www.privacy.gov.au/privacy_rights/laws/index.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2007).
285. Personal information is defined as “an opinion (including information or an opinion
forming part of a database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form or
not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the
information or opinion.” Privacy Act, 1988, as amended 2006, pt. 2, §6(1) (Austl.). Thus, call
records would likely fit within the definition as a person’s identity can be reasonably ascertained
from person’s phone number by matching that number to a name in the phone book. See Sarah
Harrison, The Privacy Amendments—What Do They Mean for General Insurance Claims?, 2002
INS. L.J. (Austl.) 13 n.18 (July 26, 2002) (defining personal information as “a person’s name,
address, phone number, email address, birth date, marital information etc.”) (emphasis added).
286. National Privacy Principles Act, supra note 282, § 2.1. The exceptions are found under
2.1 and include (a) where “the secondary purpose [of disclosure] is related to the primary
purpose of collection and . . . the individual would reasonably expect the organization to . . .
disclose the information for the secondary purpose”; (b) consent by a person; (c) the person’s
non-sensitive information will be used for direct marketing and five other conditions are met;
(d) the person’s health information is required for research related to public safety and three
other conditions are met; (e) disclosure is necessary to protect an imminent threat to a person’s
safety, health, or life or “a serious threat to public health or public safety”; (ee) genetic
information obtain through providing health service and three other conditions are met; (f)
organization believes that unlawful activity is occurring and discloses the personal information
for an investigation; (g) authorized by law; (h) disclosure is necessary for an enforcement body
such as law enforcement or public revenue protection. Id. § 2.1(a)-(h).
287. Office of the Privacy Comm’r, Guidelines to the National Privacy Principles, Sept.
2001, http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/nppgl_01.html [hereinafter Guidelines].
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likely applies.288 The only exceptions likely to apply are that the
289
disclosure is necessary to prevent an imminent or serious threat or is
290
necessary for an enforcement body.
The threat exception is not
applicable because most, if not all, the records were collected to
prevent possible future threats, and this exception allows disclosure in
emergency situations only.291 Under the enforcement body exception,
disclosure is permitted to prevent or investigate a criminal offense,292
which is “an act or practice that is prohibited by criminal law at
293
Commonwealth or State and Territory level.” Thus, disclosure of
call records would not be permitted because there is no criminal act.
Notwithstanding
the
limitation
imposed
on
the
telecommunication providers through the NPPs, the government
could still not acquire the call records based on the IPPs. Under IPP
1, the government can only collect personal information lawfully, and
the collection has to be related to the government’s purpose.294
Moreover, IPP 3 states that when the government requests personal
information, the information must be relevant to the agency’s reason
for collecting it.295 If the government collected numerous call records,
it would violate IPP1 for two reasons. First, it would be acting
without a warrant and therefore unlawfully. Second, any collected
call records would not have the necessary connection to terrorism and
therefore fail to serve the government’s terrorist prevention purpose.
2. Datamining the Call Records.
Australia’s federal
296
constitution does not include provisions relating to privacy. In fact,

288. It is unlikely a person consents to datamining for national security purposes through
phone contracts and the direct marketing, unlawful activity, authorized by law, health, and
genetic exceptions are not applicable.
289. National Privacy Principles Act, supra note 282, § 2.1(e).
290. Id. § 2.1(h)(i)-(v).
291. Guidelines, supra note 287.
292. National Privacy Principles Act, supra note 282, § 2.1(h)(i).
293. INFORMATION SHEET 7—2001 Unlawful Activity and Law Enforcement, OFFICE
OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R (Dec.
2001), available at http://www.privacy.gov.au/
publications/IS7_01.doc.
294. Plain English Guidelines to Information Privacy: Principles 1- 3, OFFICE OF THE
PRIVACY COMM’R, 2 (1994), available at http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/HRC_
PRIVACY_PUBLICATION.word_file.p6_4_14.4.doc.
295. Id. at 4.
296. LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENCES COMM., THE REAL BIG BROTHER:
INQUIRY INTO THE PRIVACY ACT 1988, at 10 (2005) available at http://www.aph.gov.au/
senate/committee/legcon_ctte/privacy/report/report.pdf
(stating that “[t]he Australian Constitution does not expressly protect privacy”).
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Australia currently does not have a bill of rights.297 Australians must
therefore turn to other sources of law, such as international
298
agreements or domestic privacy statutes, for protection against
interference with their private life.
Australia ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1980.299 Article 17 of ICCPR provides
that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy . . . [and] [e]veryone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference.”300 Moreover, “any [arbitrary]
interference with privacy must be proportional to the end sought and
301
be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.”
Based in part on the ICCPR, the Australian government, in 1980,
adopted a domestic Federal Privacy Act, discussed above, to protect
302
In
against unlawful or arbitrary interference with privacy.
particular, IPP 9 states that personal information can only be used by
303
an agency “for a purpose to which the information is relevant.”

297. James Allan & Grant Huscroft, Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? Rights
Internationalism in American Courts, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 16 (2006).
298. LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENCES COMM., supra note 296, at 8 (stating that
“[t]here are several key sources of international law and standards relevant to privacy
protection in Australia. In particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) recognises the right to privacy in Article 17.”); See George Williams, Bali, Terrorism
& Australia: The Rule of Law and Human Rights in Australia after Bali, AUSTL. POL’Y ONLINE,
Nov. 19, 2002, http://www.apo.org.au/webboard/results.chtml?filename_num=00172 (stating that
“the absence of a domestic Bill of Rights means that Australians turn to international law”);
299. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
300. Id. art. 17. In addition to the ICCPR, Australia also ratified the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A
(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). The UDHR in Article 12 contains a similar provision as
ICCPR’s Article 17 providing that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy . . . . Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference.” Id.
art. 12.
301. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5,
paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Commc’n No. 488/1992, ¶ 8.3, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Mar. 31, 1994).
302. Chris Cowper, Successful Complaints to the Federal Privacy Commissioner, BAKER &
MCKENZIE CYBERSPACE L. & POL’Y CTR. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., Dec. 4, 2003,
http://www.privacy.gov.au/news/speeches/sp22_03.doc (stating that “the Privacy Act was . . . a
response to Australia’s commitment as a party to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Right to ‘adopt such legislative measures as may be necessary to gives effect to the
right of persons not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy,
home, family or correspondence’”).
303. Plain English Guidelines to Information Privacy: Principles 8-11, OFFICE OF THE
PRIVACY COMM’R 4 (1996), available at http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/ipp8_11.doc
(stating that use includes “any accessing by an agency of personal information” such as
searching records).
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Additionally, IPP 10.1 states that personal information obtained by
an agency can only be used for a particular purpose unless one of the
304
five exceptions applies. Further, that purpose must be well defined,
that is, the agency “must know exactly why it is obtaining the
305
information.”
Both IPP 9 and 10 and Article 17 of ICCPR would be violated if
the government mined the call records for national security reasons.
First, millions of call records would belong to people who are not
terrorist suspects, thereby violating the relevance requirement in IPP
9. Next, the purpose would not be sufficiently well-defined or specific
to satisfy the requirements of IPP 10.1 because it would be so broad
as to include almost all personal information. Moreover, none of the
five exceptions in 10.1(a)-(e) likely apply to exempt the government
306
from IPP 10.1. Finally, mining millions of call records would violate
Article 17 of ICCPR, as there are less intrusive means to protect
national security.
CONCLUSION
In analyzing the NSA call database under U.S. law, the first legal
question focused on whether the NSA could legally obtain call
records from the telecommunication providers. If the NSA did not
obtain a warrant, it violated FISA. Further, an examination of the
Pen Register Statute revealed that although the government did not
violate the statute, the government should be liable for circumventing
it. Alternatively, the FBI could not obtain the call records and then
transfer them to the NSA using a NSL. Finally, analysis of this first
question concluded by finding that the phone providers violated the
1996 Telecommunications Act for voluntary disclosure of call records.
However, the providers did not likely violate the 1986 Stored
Communications Act because they transferred real time, as opposed
to stored, records to the NSA.
The next question analyzed whether datamining the call records
violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizures. Both Miller and Smith likely dictate that a
person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their phone
records voluntarily given to a third-party. However, it is conceivable
that the Court could find that the searching technology employed by

304. Information Privacy Principles, supra note 283.
305. Plain English Guidelines to Information Privacy: Principles 8-11, supra note 303.
306. Information Privacy Principles, supra note 283.
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the NSA requires such a privacy interest. Through opinion polls and
lawsuits, society seems to be indicating that it would recognize such a
privacy interest.
After analyzing the relevant two questions, the focus switched to
defenses available to the government, such as the state secrets
privilege and the President’s authority (both express and inherent).
Under the state secrets privilege, the government would likely prevail
because there have been no public disclosures about the call
database. As for the President’s authority, he lacks both express
authority under the AUMF and inherent authority to bypass FISA.
Finally, the call database was analyzed under Canadian, British,
and Australian law, and it was determined that the call database
program was likely illegal in all countries. Canada’s PIPEDA and
Privacy Act prevent the government from acquiring call records while
§ 8 of the Charter might prohibit mining of those records. The
expansive national security legislation in the United Kingdom would
seem to allow the collection of call records, but the ECHR would
appear to prevent mining those records.
In Australia, the NPPs and IPPs would likely prevent the
Australian government from acquiring call records unless it can
obtain those records from another agency. Also, IPP 9 and 10 and
Article 17 of the ICCPR would likely prohibit datamining, as its
purpose would not be well-defined, and the call records themselves
would not be relevant to the national security purpose.
In sum, this Note explores a wide range of legal issues connected
to the privacy protections from government intrusions. In today’s
society, this is significantly important as new technology allows the
government to use information in new and previously unimaginable
ways. Thus, there needs to be protection to ensure that even when
national security is at its pinnacle, privacy is not sacrificed without
justification and never completely.

